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This paper deals with price competition among multiproduct firms. We consider 
a model with n firms and one representative buyer. Each firm produces a set of products 
that can be different or identical to the other firms' products. The buyer is characterized 
by her willingness to pay -in monetary terms- for every subset of products. To handle 
the combinatorial complexity of this general setting we use the linear relaxation of an 
integer programming package assignment problem. This approach allows to 
characterize all the equilibrium outcomes. We look for subgame perfect Nash 
equilibrium prices in mixed bundling strategies, i.e., when firms offer consumers the 
option of buying goods separately or else packages of them at a discount over the single 
good prices. We find that a mixed bundling subgame perfect Nash equilibrium price 
vector always exists. Also, the associated equilibrium outcome is always efficient, in the 
sense that it maximizes the social surplus. We extend the analysis to a model with m 
buyers and offer the conditions under which the equilibrium outcome set is non-empty. 
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 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
This paper deals with price competition among multiproduct ﬁrms. We
consider a model with n ﬁrms and one representative buyer. Each ﬁrm pro-
duces a set of products that can be diﬀerent or identical to the other ﬁrms’
products. The buyer is characterized by her willingness to pay -in mone-
tary terms- for every subset of products. We show that a mixed bundling
subgame perfect equilibrium outcome always exists and it is eﬃcient in the
sense of maximizing the social surplus. Then, we extend the analysis to a
model with m buyers and oﬀer the conditions under which the equilibrium
outcome set is non-empty.
Mixed bundling1 refers to the practice of oﬀering consumers the option
of buying goods separately or else packages of them (at a discount over the
single good prices). This pricing strategy has often been seen as a form of
price discrimination. The traditional theory on this angle begins with the
observation by Stigler (1963) that bundling can increase a seller’s proﬁts
when consumers’ reservation prices for two goods are negatively correlated.
In the two goods case, oﬀering both a two-good bundle as well as the in-
dividual items (mixed bundling) is typically optimal (Adams and Yellen,
1976; McAfee, McMillan and Whinston, 1989). This is because bundling
reduces heterogeneity in consumer valuations, enabling a monopolist to bet-
ter price discriminate (Schmalensee, 1984), while still capturing residual
demand through unit sale. While the insight that bundling reduces hetero-
geneity in valuations is quite general, other aspects of these solutions often
do not generalize beyond the two-goods case. Tractable analytical solutions
have been found for a variety of special cases such as linear utilities or when
valuations across diﬀerent consumers can be ordered in speciﬁcw a y so rs a t -
isfy certain separability conditions (Armstrong, 1996; Sibley and Srinagesh,
1997). Nowadays, there have been several studies that have considered large
number bundling problems in speciﬁc contexts related to information goods2
pricing (Chuang and Sirbu, 1999). These studies generally found that en-
gaging in a form of mixed bundling where a certain large bundle is oﬀered
along side individual sale dominates either strategy alone. However, most
1Examples of mixed budling are season tickets, ﬁlm with camera, all-included vacation
packages, round-trip airline tickets, etc.
2The emergence of Internet as a low-cost, mass distribution medium has renewed in-
terest in pricing structures for information and other digital goods. Thus, publishers,
software producers, music distributors, cable television operators, etc. face similar proﬁts’
maximizing problems.
3of the results are more empirical than analytical.
The conditions of competition can be quite diﬀerent when there are
more than one competing ﬁrms and, therefore the analysis of the eﬀect of
mixed bundling becomes more complicated. Duopoly was considered by
Economides (1993), in a model where ﬁrms produce complementary goods,
and shows that mixed bundling is a dominant strategy for both ﬁrms. In
ad i ﬀerent but related set up, Liao and Urbano (2002, LU hereafter) and
Liao and Tauman (2002, LT, hereafter), assume that ﬁrms produce each
two complementary goods which are substitutes for the two corresponding
goods produced by the other ﬁrm. Thus, the two products of each ﬁrm
forms a pure system; but the ﬁrms produce modular components, in the
sense that consumers can costlessly assemble mixed systems composed of
any two complementary goods of the two diﬀerent ﬁrms. LT ﬁnd that mixed
bundling strategies play a key role in stabilizing the market. If the use of
mixed bundling is not allowed, LU show that subgame perfect linear pricing
equilibria may fail to exists. The possibility of non existence of linear-pricing
equilibrium when ﬁrms produce several goods is in contrasts with the result
of Tauman et al. (1997, TUW, hereafter), and Arribas and Urbano (2003a,
AU hereafter), who always guarantee it. These last two papers, however,
deal with a simple model of price competition in a multiproduct oligopoly
market, where ﬁrms only produce a product and the representative consumer
buys either one or zero units of each product. In a setting of a discrete choice
model of product diﬀerentiation (logit model), Anderson and Leruth (1993,
AL hereafter), show that only pure component pricing (linear pricing) may
be oﬀered at equilibrium since ﬁrms fear the extra degree of competition
inherent in mixed bundling. Very recently, Gandal, Markovich and Riordan
(2002) have examine the importance of strategic bundling for the evolution
of market structure and the performance of the PC oﬃce software market.
Also through a discrete choice model of product diﬀerentiation, they ﬁnd
strong empirical support for negative correlation in consumer preferences
over world processors and spreadsheets. This negative correlation creates
an incentive for strategic bundling3.
Most of the above models -dealing with duopoly markets, where each
ﬁrm produces two complementary goods- predict mixed bundling as a result
of multiproduct competition. However, a general analysis is still lacking
and, what is worse, it is not even know if a Nash equilibrium may exist
in such a general setting. Our analysis is a ﬁrst attempt to show the ex-
3Incentive that Microsoft exploited succesfully with its oﬃce suite products!
4istence of mixed bundling equilibrium prices in a model with multiproduct
ﬁrms, where products are of a very general nature. To set up a model where
oligopolistic ﬁrms may follow mixed bundling strategies, we start by assum-
ing a representative buyer, extending the analysis to m buyers later on.
Mixed bundling is an aggressive pricing policy in oligopolistic settings: it
forces ﬁrms to reduce prices in an attempt to keep a competitive advantage,
and therefore the assumption of a representative buyer is not as restrictive
as it may appear at a ﬁrst glance. Firms deal with only a (type of) buyer,
what gives place to a tougher competition among ﬁrms, thus adding to the
extra degree of competition inherent in mixed bundling.
Once we abandon the world of two ﬁrms and two products, the number
of consumption bundles grows exponentially and it is extremely diﬃcult to
ﬁnd the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium outcomes by checking and avoid-
ing all the possible deviations. To generalize the above analysis is, then,
necessary, to use tools with better handle these combinatorial complexity.
In this sense, the integer programming package problem, or better, its linear
relaxation allows us to characterize all price vectors satisfying Nash equilib-
rium subgame perfection in a huge set.
Firms do not precommit to a particular pricing strategies prior to the
choice of actual prices, this meaning that mixed bundling pricing is not
excluded. We look for subgame perfect Nash equilibrium prices in mixed
bundling. If the use of mixed bundling strategies is not allowed, equilib-
rium may not exist (this was shown in LU). In contrast, we show here that
a mixed bundling (subgame perfect) Nash equilibrium price vector always
exists. Hence, mixed bundling is important to stabilize the market. Fur-
thermore, we ﬁnd that mixed bundling in oligopolistic competition induce
consumers to select the eﬃcient consumption set, i.e., the consumption set
which maximizes the social surplus. This is not always the case, when mixed
bundling is excluded.
We show that the optimal solutions of the linear relaxation of the above
mentioned integer integer programming package assignment problem are the
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium proﬁts or net prices and consumption set.
It is interesting to note that the optimal solutions of a linear programming
problem are a polyhedron, and so is the projection of the dual problem’s
solutions on ﬁrms’ net price vectors. This polyhedron is completely deter-
mined by its vertices. The Pareto frontier of the above projection has to
be identiﬁed in order to characterize the set of all subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium net price vectors. As this frontier can be expressed as the con-
vex combination of non-Pareto dominated vertices, we just need to obtain
5all these vertices. At every equilibrium, a non-active ﬁrm sets marginal
costs prices, and the active ﬁrms’s net prices are the non-Pareto dominated
vectors of the above Pareto frontier. When, the equilibrium consumption
set is pure, i.e., it consists only of products of a ﬁrm, then non-active ﬁrms
prices are set equal to marginal costs, and the selected ﬁrm’s price is a
bundling price, leaving the buyer with some surplus. On the contrary, if
the equilibrium consumption set is composed of a product of each ﬁrm, a
completely mixed bundle, then the buyer pays the sum of the individual
products’s prices, even though bundles are oﬀered at special prices. Thus,
mixed bundling prices are here oﬀ-equilibrium prices but are used to sustain
the equilibrium. Then, LT and AL results are especial cases of our general
model.
When the social value function for bundles of goods is monotonic and
ﬁrms are substitutes, then equilibrium net prices are the social marginal
contributions of ﬁrms, reﬂecting the underlying market competition. When
it is convex equilibrium net prices coincide with the core of the economy.
The market model considered here is also related to the matching lit-
erature (see, Kelso and Crawford 1982, KC) and with assignment games.
In particular, some extensions of the canonical standard assignment model,
with many sellers and buyers interacting have received and increasing at-
tention recently. These models are two-side matching markets, where sellers
have an initial endowment of indivisible objects and buyers have an utility
function over any package or bundle of objects. Diﬀerences in the framework
are based on the units produced (each seller has only one product and only
one unit of this product or their have no restriction on their production);
the units purchased (just one or a bundle); the number of sellers (one or
more); the number of buyers; the price of a bundle (additive or non-additive
pricing function), etc.
The package assignment problem has been studied by Gul and Stacchetti
(1999, GS), Bikhchandani and Mamer (1997, BM) and Bikhchandani and
Ostroy (2001, BO), among others. In all these papers utilities are quasilinear
in money, deﬁned on bundles of goods and buyers play the same role; they
select, given ﬁrms’ prices, the best bundle. The main diﬀerence between our
model and theirs is that we deal with strategic equilibrium where ﬁrms are
price setters, while they deal with Walrasian equilibria. Other diﬀerence is
that we deal with a representative buyer (although we extend some of our
results to m buyers), but have no restriction on the set of goods, while, for
instance, GS deal with heterogeneous buyers, but with goods which have no
complementarities (a notion closely related to gross substitutability). BM
6and BO give a linear programming (LP) characterization of the Walrasian
equilibrium outcomes while we formulate the Nash equilibrium of a multi-
product market with a representative buyer, as an extension of the package
assignment model and show the equivalence of some linear programming
solutions and Nash equilibrium outcomes.
The paper is organized as follows. The model is presented in section 2,
while the integer programming package assignment problem and its linear
relaxation are oﬀered in section 3. The main results are provided in section 4,
where we show the existence of mixed bundling equilibria and characterize
the equilibrium outcome set. Speciﬁc results for monotonic, concave and
convex value functions are oﬀered in section 5. Section 6 cares about the
role of mixed bundling. The model with m buyers is the subject of section
7, and it concludes the paper.
2 The model
Consider an economy with n ﬁrms and one buyer. Each ﬁrm produces a
set of products and one ﬁrm’s products can be diﬀerent from or identical to
the other ﬁrms’ products. Let N = {1,2,...,n} be the set of ﬁrms. Let Ωi
be ﬁrm i’s set of products and Ω = ∪i∈NΩi be the set of all products. Let
ci(wi) be the (constant) unit cost of production of ﬁrm i for product wi ∈ Ωi,
where costs are additive, i.e., ci(Ti)=
 
w∈Ti ci(w),T i ⊆ Ωi,a n df o ra n ys e t
S ⊆ Ω,w i t hSi = S ∩ Ωi for all i,l e tc(S)=( c1(S1),c 2(S2),···,c n(Sn)) be
the associated cost vector.
A consumption set is a subset S ⊆ Ω.Aﬁrm is said to be non-active in
a given consumption set if none of its products is consumed. We will write
Si ∈ S to mean that ﬁrm i sells set Si in S,i . e .Si = S ∩ Ωi and let F(S)
be the set of active ﬁrms in S,i . e . ,F(S)={i ∈ N|S ∩Ωi  = ∅}. The buyers
is characterized by a value function over any subset S ⊆ Ω, v(S), which
represents her total willingness to pay for consumption set S,w i t hv(∅)=0 .
Each ﬁrm i sets prices for its Ωi products. It can also oﬀer subsets of
them as bundles for a special price. Thus, a strategy of ﬁrm i, i ∈ N,i sa
2Ωi-tuple specifying the price of each w ∈ Ωi as well as the prices of each
any other subset of Ωi,i . e . ,ﬁrm i chooses a price function pi ∈ Pi,w h e r e
Pi = R2Ωi
+ = {the set of vectors pi :2 Ωi −→ R+ with 2Ωi = {Ti|Ti ⊆ Ωi}}.
Let pi(Ti)b et h ep r i c eo fTi ⊆ Ωi,i fpi(Ti)=
 
w∈Ti pi(w), then prices are
linear and bundle Ti is oﬀered for no special price. If pi(Ti) <
 
w∈Ti pi(w),
then the price of Ti is subadditive, and Ti is oﬀered as a bundle at a lower
7price. In this case, we say that ﬁrm i follows a mixed bundling strategy. To
avoid irrational oﬀ-equilibrium behavior, we restrict pi(Ti), i ∈ N, Ti ⊆ Ωi,
to satisfy pi(Ti) ≥ ci(Ti)=
 
w∈Ti ci(w).
The sequence of events is as follows. First, each ﬁrm i chooses a price
pi(Ti) for any set Ti ⊆ Ωi independently and simultaneously to the other
ﬁrms. Then, the buyer observes price vector p =( p1,...,p n) ∈ P1 ×···×P n,
and selects a consumption set S ⊆ Ω as a function of p.F o r m a l l y ,w eh a v ea
strategic game with n+1players,n ﬁrms and a representative buyer, player
0. Let GMB(n+1,v,c) (where MB stands for mixed bundling pricing) denote
such a game. The set of strategies of each ﬁrm is the set Pi and that of the
buyer is S0 the set of functions S from P1 ×···×P n to 2Ω. Finally, the
proﬁt function for each ﬁrm i ∈ N is given by
πi(S,p)=
 
pi(Si) − ci(Si) Si ∈ S(p)
0 Si / ∈ S(p)
where S(p) is the buyer’s consumption set corresponding to p. The pay-
oﬀ function of the buyer is her consumer surplus: cs(S,p)=v(S(p)) −  
Sk∈S(p) p(Sk).
Let SPE be the set of pure strategy subgame perfect equilibria of GMB(n+
1,v,c). If (S,p)i sa ne l e m e n ti nSPE, p is called an SPE-price vector, S
is an SPE-consumption set and (S,p) is denoted an SPE-outcome.
Throughout the paper we denote by |S| the number of products in con-
sumption set S ⊆ Ω.
2.1 Mixed bundling pricing equilibria
Firms do not precommit to linear pricing and then the price of a subset of
products can be diﬀerent from the sum of the prices of its products. That
is, let pi(Ti) be the price of bundle Ti ⊆ Ωi,t h e npi(Ti) ≤
 
w∈Ti pi(w),
i.e. bundle Ti m i g h tb eo ﬀered for special price. In the sequel, we charac-
terize the SPE-outcomes, where ﬁrms might use mixed bundling strategies.
Assume that the buyer can buy at most one package or bundle from each
ﬁrm.
Let set S ⊆ Ω be a consumption set and recall that F(S)i st h es e to f
active ﬁrms in S. The subgame perfect Nash-equilibrium conditions preclude
unilateral deviations from the buyer and from each ﬁrm. Namely, we need
conditions that guarantee that each active ﬁrm does not have an incentive to
either increase the equilibrium prices of its sold bundles (FC1) or to modify
8those of unsold bundles in order to proﬁtably sell any of them (FC2). More
precisely, in a mixed bundling pricing framework the price of each bundle
can be set independently of those of the other bundles with some products
in common. Thus, let (  S,  p)b ea nSPE-outcome, condition FC2 below says
that no ﬁrm j in F(  S)b e n e ﬁts from price reductions of unsold bundles:
i.e.   S has to remain a buyer best choice even if j ∈ F(  S) reduces the
prices of every Sj ⊆ Ωj, Sj  =   Sj,t o  pj(Sj) − cj(Sj)=  pj(  Sj) − cj(  Sj), or
  pj(Sj)=  pj(  Sj)−cj(  Sj)+cj(Sj). The intuition is as follows. Let j ∈ F(  S),
and consider any other consumption set S,w h e r ej ∈ F(S). Since (  S,  p)i s
an SPE-outcome, the buyer maximizes her surplus, i.e.,
v(  S) −
 
i∈F(  S)




Then, ﬁrm j may have an incentive to change the price of Sj ∈ S in
order S becomes as attractive as   S to the buyer and to obtain a proﬁta t
least equal to   pj(  Sj)−cj(  Sj). The minimum price verifying these properties
is precisely, pj(Sj)=  pj(  Sj) − cj(  Sj)+cj(Sj).
It is not diﬃcult to show that (Ω,   p)i sa nSPE-outcome iﬀ   p ≥ c and
(BC) Buyer optimality: v(Ω)−
 
i∈N   pi(Ωi) ≥ v(S)−
 
i∈F(S)   pi(Si), for
all S ⊆ Ω;











(FC2) Firm optimality:F o re a c hj ∈ N and all S ⊆ Ω such that j ∈ F(S)
v(  S) −
 
i∈N




Notice that (BC) is implied by the subgame perfection requirement, and
(FC1) and (FC2) by ﬁrms’ incentives. To see this, suppose that (FC1) does










and then ﬁrm j is better oﬀ c h a r g i n gap r i c e  pj(Ωi)+ε,f o ras u ﬃciently small
ε > 0, such that (BC) is still satisﬁed for all Sj ⊆ Ω\Ωj. This implies that
9the buyer observing the new price vector will again choose the consumption
set Ω, but ﬁrm j obtains an extra gain of ε. Hence (FC1) must be veriﬁed
if (Ω,   p)i sa nSPE-outcome.
If (FC2) does not hold, then for some ﬁrm j ∈ N there exists a con-
sumption set S ⊆ Ω such that
v(  S) −
 
i∈N




Hence ﬁrm j can set a price pj(Sj)=  pj(Ωj)−cj(Ωj)+cj(Sj)+ε,f o ra
suﬃciently small ε > 0, such that
v(  S) −
 
i∈N




which implies that the buyer will select the consumption set S and ﬁrm j
will increase its proﬁts.
Conversely if (BC), (FC1) and (FC2) are satisﬁed then (Ω,   p)i sa nSPE-
outcome since Ω is a best choice for the buyer and no ﬁrm has an incentive
to either reduce or increase its p r i c e s .N o t i c et h a tt h es e tSj in (FC1) may
be empty and in this case v(Ω) −
 
i∈N   pi(Ωi) = 0, and ﬁrms extract the
entire consumer surplus.
Suppose now that (  S,  p)i sa nSPE-outcome with   S  = Ω. Then, the
equilibrium conditions have to additionally guarantee that no ﬁrm j outside
of   S beneﬁts from price reductions and thus   S has to remain a buyer best
choice even if j/ ∈ F(  S) reduces its prices to its marginal cost levels,   pj(Tj)=
cj(Tj), for all Tj ⊆ Ωj. The next Proposition characterizes the set of SPE-
outcomes.
Proposition 1 (  S,  p) is an SPE-outcome, where   S ⊆ Ω and   p =(   p1,...,  pn),
  pi ∈ Pi with   p ≥ c ,i fa n do n l yi f
(BC) v(  S) −
 
i∈F(  S)   pi(  Si) ≥ v(S) −
 
i∈F(S)   pi(Si), for all S ⊆ Ω,
(FC1) For every j ∈ F(  S) there exists Sj ⊆ Ω\Ωj such that
v(  S) −
 
i∈F(  S)






(FC2) For each j ∈ F(  S) and all S ⊆ Ω such that j ∈ F(S)
v(  S) −
 
i∈F(  S)




10(FC3) For each j/ ∈ F(  S) and for all S ⊆ Ω such that j ∈ F(S)
v(  S) −
 
i∈F(  S)




However, we consider only the set of pure strategy subgame perfect equi-
librium points of the above economy which remains as equilibrium outcomes
even if all non-active ﬁrms set marginal cost prices and all active ﬁrms set
prices for their unsold bundles equal to those of their sold ones adjusted by
the cost-diﬀerential4. In other words, we want (FC3) to be satisﬁed for all
subsets A ⊆ N\F(  S) and (FC2) for all subsets B ⊆ F(  S). This restric-
tion removes the set of equilibrium outcomes in which some ﬁrms charge
unreasonably high prices so that no individual ﬁrm can beneﬁtf r o map r i c e
reduction of its products only. To see this, consider the following example:
Example. Let N = {1,2} and Ω1 = {a,b} and Ω2 = {c,d}. Assume for
simplicity that ci(w) = 0 for all i ∈ N,w ∈ Ω. The buyer value function is,
v(S)=

    
    
2 S = {a,b}
9 S = {a,d}
5 S = {b,c}
3 S = {c,d}
0 otherwise
The pair (  S,  p), where   S = {b,c},p a = pd = pab = pcd =1 0 0 0 ,p b =3
and pc =2 ,i sa nSPE-outcome (veriﬁes BC to FC3), where the consumer
surplus is cs(  S)=v(b,c) − pb − pc =0a n dp r o ﬁts of ﬁrms 1 and 2 are
pb =2a n dpc = 3 respectively. However, if ﬁrm 1 reduces the prices of its
unsold bundles ({a}, {a,b})t ob ee q u a lt opb =3 ,and ﬁrm 2 sets prices
for bundles ({d}, {b,c}), bounded above by pc = 2, then the above SPE is
upset, since now cs(a,d)=v(a,d)−pa−pd =9−3−2=4> 0=cs(  S)a n d
the consumer will choose bundle S = {a,d} instead of   S.I ti se a s i l yc h e c k e d
that under this restriction, an SPE-outcome is (  S,  p), where   S = {a,d},
pa = pab =4 ,p b =0a n dpc = pd = pcd =5 .
To deﬁne this restriction on the set of subgame perfect Nash equilibria
consider price vector p =( p1,...,p n) ∈ P1 ×···×P n, and let S ⊆ Ω.D e ﬁne
4Notice that if marginal costs are assumed tob ez e r o ,t h e s ep r i c e sa m o u n tt ob ee q u a l
to those of the sold bundles.






pi(Si)i f i ∈ F(S),T i = Si
pi(Si) − ci(Si)+ci(Ti)i f i ∈ F(S),T i  = Si
ci(Ti)i f i/ ∈ F(S)
i.e. the non-active ﬁrms set prices equal to the marginal cost, and all ac-
tive ﬁrms set prices for unsold bundles equal to those of their sold bundles
adjusted by the cost-diﬀerentials.
Deﬁnition 1 For every triple (N,v,c) deﬁne
SPE∗ = {(S,p) ∈ SPE|p ≥ c and (S,pS) ∈ SPE}
Equivalently, SPE∗ is the set of equilibrium outcomes satisfying BC,
FC1, and FC4 (instead of FC2 and FC3), where FC4 says,
(FC4) For all A ⊆ N\F(  S), all B ⊆ F(  S)a n df o ra l lS ⊆ Ω such that
(A ∪ B) ⊆ F(S),
v(  S) −
 
i∈F(  S)











Thus, we restrict the analysis to a certain subset SPE∗ of SPE-outcomes.
Notice that an SPE∗-outcome is a vector of prices and an assignment
of ﬁrms to the buyer, such that each active ﬁrm sells a bundle to the buyer;
ﬁrms maximize their proﬁts and the buyer maximizes her surplus. This is
quite similar to a package assignment model, where ﬁrms set prices to sell
packages from among their feasible sets in order to maximize their proﬁts.
Let (v − c)(S)=v(S) −
 
i∈F(S) ci(Si)b et h esocial surplus function of




i∈F(S)[pi(Si) − ci(Si)] be the
sum of ﬁrms’ proﬁts. Deﬁne V (K) as the maximum gain available in the
economy consisting of a representative buyer and the ﬁrms in K ⊆ N,i . e .
the maximum social surplus. Finally, let (S,p) be any assignment such that
Si = ∅ for all i ∈ N\K and pi ≥ ci for all i ∈ K,t h e n






























12If   S ∈ argmax(S){(v − c)(S)},w es a yt h a t  S is socially eﬃcient.S i n c e
we are interested in the eﬃciency of SPE∗-outcomes, we will compare them
with the core of the economy.
Deﬁnition 2 (T-Core) Let T ⊆ N.T h e T-core of the economy G(n +





i∈N qi = V (T)
(ii) qb +
 
i∈K qi ≥ V (S), ∀S ⊆ N
The element qb is the consumer surplus and each qi are ﬁrm i’s proﬁts.
For T = N, we obtain the core of the economy, denoted by core(G). Also,
the subset of points in T-core(G) such that the buyer surplus, qb,i se q u a l
to zero deﬁnes the T-core of (v − c)o rT-core(v − c),




qi = V (T)a n d
 
i∈S∩T
qi ≥ V (S)f o ra l lS ⊆ N}
The intuition of T-core(v−c) is as follows. Suppose that the equilibrium
consumption set is T. Then, ﬁrms in N\T obtain zero proﬁts and hence will
be willing to join the set of seller ﬁrms. Hence, every subset S ⊆ T can
actually achieve uT(S)w h e r e ,
uT(S)= m a x
A⊆N\T
{(v − c)(S ∪ A)}
It is easily checked that the projection of the T-core(v−c)o nT coincides
with the N-core(uT), or core(v − c), when the buyer surplus is zero.
Finally, we assume that the social surplus of the economy is positive.
Otherwise, if for every consumption set S,( v(S)−
 
i∈F(S) ci(Si)) < 0, then
the economy is degenerated. Hence, at every equilibrium point (S,p), S = ∅
must hold and therefore, no production will take place.
2.2 Examples
Example 1: Let N = {1,2} and Ω1 = {a,b} and Ω2 = {c,d}.A s s u m ef o r
simplicity that ci(w) = 0 for all i ∈ N,w ∈ Ω. The buyer value function is,
v(S)=

    
    
16 S = {a,b}
15 S = {a,d}
14 S = {b,c}
δ S = {c,d}
0o t h e r w i s e
13Table 1 oﬀers the set of SPE and SPE∗ -outcomes. The two sets co-
incide because condition FC3 gives the lower bounds of prices in both sets,
and FC4 is not binding for prices and only implies eﬃciency of   S .The equi-
librium consumption set is always eﬃcient and ﬁrm 2 sets prices equal to
marginal costs (which here are zero).
Table 1: SPE = SPE∗-outcomes of example 1
0 < δ ≤ 13 13 < δ < 16
  S = {a,b},e ﬃcient   S = {a,b},e ﬃcient
pa
1 ≥ 15 − δ pa
1 ≥ max{15 − δ,0}, pb
1 ≥ max{14 − δ,0}
pb
1 ≥ 14 − δ pS = {pa
1 = pb
1 = pab





1 =1 6− δ pab
1 =1 6− δ
pc
2 ≥ 0 pc
2 ≥ 0
pd





cs = δ cs = δ
The assumption that the consumer can buy at most a bundle from each
ﬁrm may imply superadditive prices; for instance, if we consider only the
prices’ lower bounds pab
1 <p a
1 + pb
1,f o r0< δ < 13, pab
1 = pa
1 + pb




1,f o r1 3< δ < 16. However, this possibility is ruled out for
SPE∗-outcomes under vector pS,w h e r epa
1 = pb
1 = pab




2 =0 ,f o rﬁrm 2. Firm 1’s proﬁts are pab
1 =1 6−δ, ﬁrm 2’s
proﬁts are zero and the consumer surplus is cs = δ.
The core of the economy is,
core(G)={(qb,q 1,q 2) ∈ R3
+|0 ≤ q1 ≤ 16 − δ,q 2 =0 ,q b =1 6− q1 ≥ δ}.
Hence, the SPE∗-price vector is the element of core(G) which maximizes
the ﬁrms’ proﬁts.
Example 2: Let N = {1,2} and Ω1 = {a,b} and Ω2 = {c,d}, ci(w)=0
for all i ∈ N,w ∈ Ω, and let the buyer value function be,
v(S)=

    
    
6 S = {a,b}
9 S = {a,d}
δ S = {b,c}
7 S = {c,d}
0 otherwise
Table 2a shows the set of SPE-equilibrium outcomes, while table 2b
oﬀers the SPE∗ mixed bundling outcomes.
14Table 2a: SPE-equilibrium outcomes of example 2
0 < δ < 9 0 < δ < 9 7 ≤ δ < 9
  S = {c,d}, ineﬃcient   S = {a,d}, eﬃcient   S = {b,c}, ineﬃcient
pa
1 ≥ 2 pa




1 ≥ max{δ − 7,0} pb
1 ≥ max{pa
1 + δ − 9,0} pb










2 ≥ max{δ − 6,0} pc
2 ≥ max{pd
2 + δ − 9,0} pc
2 ≤ δ − 6
pd
2 ≥ 3 pd













2 ≥ δ − 6
cs =6 cs =9− pa
1 − pd




0 < δ < 9















2 ≥ max{δ − 4,0}
cs =4
Thus, ﬁrm 1’s proﬁts under SPE∗-outcomes are pa
1 =2 ,ﬁrm 2’s proﬁts
are pd
2 = 3 and the consumer surplus is cs =4 .N o t i c et h a t ,SPE-outcomes,
need not be eﬃcient. For instance, ((c,d),(2,2,0),(3,3,1)) ∈ SPE-outcome
set, but it is socially ineﬃcient given that v(c,d) <v (a,d).






2,f o ra l lδ.
However, although ﬁrms oﬀer their two products as a bundle for a special
price, the buyer selects a product of each ﬁrm. Here, mixed bundling is an
oﬀ-equilibrium pricing strategy, supporting equilibrium outcomes. The core
of the economy is given by the following set,
core(G)={(qb,q 1,q 2) ∈ R3
+|0 ≤ q1 ≤ 2,0 ≤ q2 ≤ 3,qb =9− q1 − q2 ≥ 4}
Thus, as above, the vector of prices of SPE∗-outcomes is the element of
core(G) which maximizes the ﬁrms’ proﬁts.
153 The associated Package Assignment problem.
Our main result shows that there always exists an equilibrium outcome in
our model. Moreover, the set of SPE∗-outcomes is equivalent to integer-
valued solutions of the linear relaxation of a package assignment problem
(LP hereafter).
For any S ⊆ Ω,d e ﬁne zS which is equal to 1 if the buyer chooses con-
sumption set S;a n df o ra l lﬁrm i ∈ N and any set of its products Ti ⊆ Ωi,
let y(Ti,i)=1i fﬁrm i sells bundle Ti, and zero otherwise. The integer








zS ≤ 1( 1 )
 
Ti⊆Ωi
y(Ti,i) ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ N (2)
 
S Ti
zS ≤ y(Ti,i) ∀i ∈ N,∀Ti ⊆ Ωi (3)
zS,y (Ti,i) ∈ {0,1} ∀i ∈ N,∀Ti ⊆ Ωi,∀S ⊆ Ω
The ﬁrst constraint ensures that only one consumption set is selected.
The other constraints are redundant given the ﬁrst one, in the sense that
they do not reduce the set of feasible solutions. However, constraints (2)
and (3) will deﬁne the price vector in the dual problem. Constraints in (2)
guarantee that each ﬁrm only sells one consumption set, and constraints (3)
ensures that ﬁrm i sells Ti ⊆ Ωi if and only if the selected consumption set
S is such that Si = Ti.
Let us consider the linear relaxation LP of ILP in which we change the
integrity constraints zS,y (Ti,i) ∈ {0,1} in ILP to zS ≥ 0,y (Ti,i) ≥ 0. Let
DLP be the dual of LP. The interest of this formulation is that each dual
variable associated with each constraint in (2) can be interpreted as ﬁrm i’s
proﬁts (the buyer’s payment for Ti to ﬁrm i minus its marginal cost) and
each dual variable associated with constraints (3), as the net price that ﬁrm
i sets for each Ti ⊆ Ωi (i.e. prices minus marginal costs). More precisely, to
write the dual problem, we associate a variable with each of the constraints
of LP.L e tπb -the consumer surplus- be the variable associated to the ﬁrst
constraint ; let πi be the ones associated to constraints (2) and ﬁnally, let
16πi









Si ≥ (v − c)(S) ∀S ⊆ Ω (4)
πi − πi




Ti)) express a generic solution of DLP. The set of solu-
tions of ILP is the set of optimal feasible solutions (vertex points) of LP
because of its special structure. Notice that if we remove the redundant con-
straints of LP we are left with the constraint whose coeﬃcients are equal
to 1 and the non-negativity conditions on variables S, for all S ⊆ N.I ti s
well known that the solutions for such a problem are integer: the variable
corresponding to the maximum coeﬃcient in the objective function is set
to 1 and the remaining variables are set to 0. Hence, in our case, an inte-
ger solution always exists and it is the consumption set   S ⊆ Ω such that
  S ∈ argmaxS⊆Ω(v − c)(S).
Moreover, by the fundamental duality theorem (see Dantzig, 1974, p.125),
if the primal problem has an optimal feasible solution, so does its dual prob-
lem and the two optimal value functions are the same. Also notice that the
set of solutions is a convex polyhedron. Denote this set by sol(.).
Interpreting variables (πi) of the dual problem as ﬁrms’ proﬁts, let us
deﬁne
Π = {(πb,(πi),(πi
Ti)) ∈ sol(DLP)| there is no other (π b,(π 
i),(π i
Ti)) ∈ sol(DLP),
such that π 
i ≥ πi, for all i and π 
j > πj for at least some j}
as the Pareto frontier of set sol(DLP). We will see below that the projection
of Π on coordinates (πi)w i l lp r o v i d et h eﬁrms’ equilibrium proﬁts. Further-
more, the set Π can be expressed as the convex combination of adjacent
vertices. A way to obtain some of these vertices is to consider, among all
solutions of the dual problem, those maximizing
 
i∈N πi. Namely, consider









Si ≥ (v − c)(S) ∀S ⊆ Ω
πi − πi




πi = V (Ω)( 6 )
πb,πi,πi
Ti ≥ 0
where the ﬁrst and second restrictions are (4) and (5) in DLP.
To generate all the frontier Π we deﬁne a family of problems which take
into account the lexicographic order of the solutions of DLP. To this end, let
µ be an ordered partition of N in the sense that the order of the elements in
the partition is relevant. Thus, µ and µ  can give rise to the same partition,
but with a diﬀerent order in their elements. Let Γ denote the set of all the
ordered partitions. Write µ = {N1,N 2,...,N L} ∈ Γ to mean that under µ
the ﬁrst element of the partition is N1, the second in N2 and the last one in
NL.N o t et h a tL can diﬀer from one partition to another.















Si ≥ (v − c)(S) ∀S ⊆ Ω
πi − πi




πi = V (Ω)
πb,πi,πi
Ti ≥ 0
where d is an integer such that Card(N) · (v − c)(S) < 10d for all S ⊆ Ω.
Note that for µ = {N} we have µ-DLP = RDLP.
The partition formulation does not change the constraints but makes
the objective function vary. The objective function is an integer for which
each set of d (consecutive) digits are determined by
 
i∈Nl πi.T h u s , t h e
ﬁrst d digits are occupied by
 
i∈N1 πi, the second d digits by
 
i∈N2 πi
18and so on, and, ﬁnally, the last d digits by
 
i∈NL πi.I n t h i s w a y , sol(µ-
DLP) ⊆ sol(DLP)s ot h a t ,as o l u t i o ni nµ-DLP gives one of the most
preferred proﬁt vectors by ﬁrms in N1; it gives one of the most preferred
proﬁtv e c t o r sb yt h es e to fﬁrms in N2, among those most preferred by ﬁrms
in N1;a n ds oo n .
Also notice that if (  πb,(  πi),(  πi
Ti)) ∈ sol(µ−DLP), then so does (  πb,(  πi),(πi
Ti)),
where   πi
Ti ≤ πi
Ti ≤   πi for all i ∈ N,Ti ⊆ Ωi. As we will see below, each
variable πi
Ti of the dual problem deﬁnes ﬁrm i’s net price. Moreover, the
µ−DLP approach does not assume any restriction on variables (  πi
Ti) for all




w∈Ti   πi
w. This translates to ﬁrm i’s pricing strategies, so that mixed
bundling strategies are allowed. In fact, the solution in which πi
Ti =   πi for
all i ∈ N,Ti ⊆ Ωi will deﬁne a mixed bundling price equilibrium.
The next Lemma shows that the dual solutions achieved by diﬀerent
partitions are in set Π.
Lemma 1 Let µ ∈ Γ and let (πb,(πi),(πi




Ti)) / ∈ Π, then there exists (  πb,(  πi),(  πi
Ti)) ∈ Π
such that πi ≤   πi for all i ∈ N and πk <   πk, for some k ∈ N.L e t µ =




















10d(L−l) = F(µ,π )
which implies that (πb,(πi),(πi
Ti)) is not a solution of µ-DLP, a contradic-
tion. 
Deﬁne the binary relation to be coarser than in set Γ as follows. Given
µ,µ  ∈ Γ,w es a yt h a tµ  = {N 
1,...,N 
L} is coarser than µ = {N1,...,N M} if
N 
1 = N1 ∪ N2 ∪ ... ∪ Nn1
N 




L = NnL−1 ∪ ... ∪ NM
19Clearly this binary relation is reﬂexive, anti-symmetric and transitive so
that it induces a partial order relation, with all the maximal chains ending
in N and starting in any of the total partitions of N.
Coarser partitions have more degrees of freedom and hence the sum of
dual solutions {πi}i∈N is bigger. This is proven in the following Lemma.
Lemma 2 Let µ,µ  ∈ Γ,w i t hµ coarser than µ .T h e n πb ≤   πb, for all
(πb,(πi),(πi
Ti)) ∈ sol(µ-DLP) and (  πb,(  πi),(  πi
Ti)) ∈ sol(µ -DLP).
Proof: It suﬃces to prove it for two consecutive partitions of a maximal






i∈Nk   πi for k =1 ,...,l− 1. Moreover,
 
i∈Nl πi ≥  
i∈Nli   πi +
 









i∈N   πiwhich implies that πb ≤   πb. 
Example 3:L e tN = {1,2}, Ω1 = {a,b}, Ω2 = {c,d},w i t hci(w)=0
for all i ∈ N,w ∈ Ω,a n dl e tt h ev a l u ef u n c t i o nb e ,
v(S)=

    
    
6 S = {a,b}
15 S = {a,d}
14 S = {b,c}
8 S = {c,d}
0o t h e r w i s e
The full list of solutions of µ-DLP problems is:
• µ = {{1},{2}}: πb =0 ,π1 = π1
a = π1
ab =7 ,π1




cd = 8, which maximizes ﬁrm 1’s proﬁt and yields, jointly with
the primal solution, outcome (  S,  p):
  S = {a,d}
  p1 =(   pa
1 =7 ,6 ≤   pb
1 ≤ 7,   pab
1 =7 )
  p2 =(   pc
2 =8 ,   pd
2 =8 ,   pcd
2 =8 ) .
It can be checked that (  S,  p)i sa nSPE∗-outcome
• µ = {{2},{1}}: πb =0 ,π1 = π1
a = π1
ab =6 ,π1




cd = 8, which maximizes ﬁrm 2’s proﬁt and now yields SPE∗-
20outcome (  S,  p):
  S = {a,d}
  p1 =(   pa
1 =6 ,5 ≤   pb
1 ≤ 6,   pab
1 =6 )
  p2 =( 8 ≤   pc
2 ≤ 9,   pd
2 =9 ,   pcd
2 =8 ) .
Moreover, both are solutions of RDLP and any convex combination of
them is also a solution of RDLP.I nf a c t ,g i v e nt w od i ﬀerent partitions,
µ and µ , and their associated solutions, (πb,(πi),(πi
Ti)) ∈ sol(µ−DLP)
and (π b,(π 
i),(π i
Ti)) ∈ sol(µ −DLP), either (πi)=( π 
i) or there is no
Pareto dominance between them. For instance, partitions µ = {{2},{1}}
and µ  = {N} deﬁne the same optimal solution, but µ = {{2},{1}} and
µ  = {{1},{2}} deﬁne solutions with non-Pareto dominance in components
(π1,π2).
Thus, (  S,  p)i sa nSPE∗-outcome with   S ∈ argmaxS⊆Ω{(v−c)(S)} and
price vector   p deﬁned as   pi(Ti)=πi
Ti + c(Ti)f o ra l lﬁrm i ∈ N and all
Ti ⊆ Ωi.N o t i c et h a tﬁrm i sets the price of any bundle Ti ⊆ Ωi, Ti ∩   S = ∅,
lower than or equal to the price of bundle   Si.A si ne x a m p l e s1a n d2a b o v e ,
the payoﬀso fSPE∗- o u t c o m e sa r et h ep o i n t so fc o r e ( G) which maximizes
ﬁrms’ joint proﬁts,
core(G)={(qb,q 1,q 2) ∈ R3
+|0 ≤ q1 ≤ 7,0 ≤ q2 ≤ 9,q 1 + q2 ≤ 15,
qb =1 5− q1 − q2 ≥ 0}
4 Mixed Bundling Subgame Perfect Nash equilib-
ria via Linear programming
4.1 Existence
Our main result establishes that an optimal solution of LP and µ−DLP is
an SPE∗-outcome (Proposition 2) of GMB.M o r e o v e r ,t h eSPE∗-consumption
s e ti sa l w a y se ﬃcient (Corollary 3). First, we start with a general property
which states that optimal solutions of LP and DLP, set the prices of non-
active ﬁrms equal to marginal costs and hence their proﬁts are zero (property
ii) and the proﬁts of any active ﬁrm are bigger than or equal to their selling
prices minus marginal costs (property i). The proofs are in the Appendix.
Le mm a 3 Le t S∈ sol (LP) and (π b , (πi ), (π i
Ti)) ∈ sol(DLP),t h e n
21i) πi = πi
  Si
(≥ πi
Ti) for all i ∈ F(  S),T i ⊆ Ωi
ii)πi = πi
Ti =0for all i/ ∈ F(  S) and Ti ⊆ Ωi.
The next Proposition gives an existence result. It shows that any ele-
ment of  sol(LP) × sol(µ-DLP)  is an SPE∗-outcome, i.e., sol(LP)g i v e
the equilibrium consumption set and sol(µ-DLP) the equilibrium proﬁts
and price vectors, for some partition µ.
Proposition 2 Let v be a value function and c a marginal cost vector. Let
  S ∈ sol(LP) and (  πb,(  πi),(  πi
Ti)) ∈ sol(µ − DLP).T h e n ,(  S,  p) ∈ SPE∗-
outcome set of GMB(n +1 ,v,c),w h e r e  πi
Ti + ci(Ti) ≤   pi(Ti) ≤   πi + ci(Ti)
for all i ∈ N and all Ti ⊆ Ωi and   pi(  Si)=  πi
  Si
+ ci(  Si).
Let us apply the above results to the previous examples.
Example 1 (continuation): Solving the primal and dual problems for








4 {a,b} 11 12 12 0 0 0
12 {a,b} 344000
15 {a,b} 011000
Deﬁning   S = {a,b} and   pi(Ti)=πi
Ti,t h e n(   S,  p) ∈ SPE∗-outcome set,
as we can check in the right hand side of table 1. For instance, for δ = 12,
the solutions to the primal and dual problems yield the SPE∗-outcome,
  S = {a,b}
  p1 =( 3 ≤   pa
1 ≤ 4,   pb
1 =4 ,   pab
1 =4 )
  p2 =(   pc
2 =0 ,   pd
2 =0 ,   pcd
2 =0 ) .




ab =2a n dπ2
c = π2
d = π2
cd =3f o ra l lδ.T h u s ,
  S = {a,b},   p1(T1) = 2 for all T1 ⊆ Ω1 and   p2(T2) = 3 for all T2 ⊆ Ω2 deﬁne
an SPE∗-outcome as we can see in the right hand side of table 2.
Finally, recalling that when µ = {N}, µ-DLP = RDLP,w en o t i c et h a t
the associated SPE∗-outcomes give the lowest surplus for the buyer. The
proof is in the Appendix.
22Corollary 1 Let v be a value function and c a marginal cost vector, let
  S ∈ sol(LP) and let (  πb,(  πi),(  πi
Ti)) ∈ sol(RDLP), then among all SPE∗-
outcomes, (  S,  p) i st h eo n ew h i c hg i v e st h el o w e s ts u r p l u st ot h eb u y e r ,w h e r e
  πi
Ti + ci(Ti) ≤   pi(Ti) ≤   πi + ci(Ti) for all i ∈ N and all Ti ⊆ Ωi and
  pi(  Si)=  πi
  Si
+ ci(  Si).
Corollary 2 For every value function v and marginal cost vector c,t h e r e
always exists an SPE∗-outcome of GMB.
Proof: The existence of an optimal solution of LP is immediate and the
fundamental duality theorem guarantees the existence of an optimal solution
of the dual linear program and hence of the restricted dual problem. Finally,
P r o p o s i t i o n2s h o w st h a tb o t hap r i m a lo p t i m a ls o l u t i o ni sa ne q u i l i b r i u m
consumption set and an optimal solution of the restricted dual problem
deﬁnes an equilibrium price vector. 
Next, we show the eﬃciency of any equilibrium consumption set.
Corollary 3 For every value function v and marginal cost vector c,   S ⊆
Ω is an equilibrium consumption set of GMB if and only if   S is socially
eﬃcient, i.e.,   S ∈ argmaxS⊆Ω{(v − c)(S)}.
Proof:L e t  S ∈ argmaxS⊆Ω{(v − c)(S)} = sol(LP) and consider any
(  πb,(  πi),(  πi




Now, let (  S,  p)b ea nSPE∗-outcome, we will show that   S ∈ sol(LP).
If (  S,  p) ∈ SPE∗-outcome set, then (  S,  p
  S) ∈ SPE∗-outcome set, where we







pi(  Si)i f i ∈ F(  S),T i =   Si
pi(  Si) − ci(  Si)+ci(Ti)i f i ∈ F(  S),T i  =   Si
ci(Ti)i f i/ ∈ F(  S)
By BC,











23for all S ⊆ Ω. Therefore,

























(  pi − ci)(  Si) ≥ 0,
given that   p
  S
i (Si)=ci(Si) for all i/ ∈ F(  S)a n dp
  S
i (Si) − ci(Si)=p
  S
i (  Si) −
ci(  Si) for all i ∈ F(  S)∩F(S). Thus, (v−c)(  S) ≥ (v−c)(S)f o re v e r yS ⊆ Ω.

4.2 Characterization of SPE∗-outcomes via Linear Program-
ming
In this section we characterize the set of equilibrium prices of eﬃcient con-
sumption sets in GMB. By Proposition 2, the optimal solutions of µ-DLP
characterize the set of SPE∗-price vectors, pS. But, as example 1 shows,
the reverse of Proposition 2 need not be satisﬁed: SPE∗-outcomes does
not always deﬁne a solution of the primal and the restricted dual prob-
lems. Notice, however, that if (S,p)a n d( S,pS)a r et w oSPE∗-outcomes
t h e n ,c l e a r l y ,t h eﬁrms and the buyer obtain the same payoﬀs under such
outcomes: the two equilibria are payoﬀ-equivalent. Thus, any pair (S,pS)
allows to identify its payoﬀ-equivalence class. For any set of payoﬀ equiva-
lent SPE∗-outcomes, we are only considering (S,pS) as the representative
outcome of this equivalence class.
Next result asserts that there is not Pareto dominance between the prof-
its’ vectors associated to two diﬀerent equilibrium outcomes.
Lemma 4 Let (  S,  p), (  S,  p) be two SPE∗-outcomes, then there exists two
active ﬁrms j,j  ∈ F(  S) such that (  pj − cj)(  Sj) > (  pj − cj)(  Sj) and (  pj  −
cj )(  Sj ) > (  pj  − cj )(  Sj ).
Proof: Suppose that (  pk − ck)(  Sk) ≥ (  pk − ck)(  Sk) for all k ∈ N where
the inequality is strict for some ﬁrm j ∈ F(  S). Then, j has incentives to
raise its equilibrium prices at (  S,  p), which is a contradiction. 
24We show next, that every ﬁrm’s proﬁt vector associated to an SPE∗-
price vector coincides with an optimal solution of the dual problem. i.e.,
every SPE∗-outcome (S,p) is such that S is the solution of the primal
problem and pS deﬁnes a solution of the dual problem. Also, by Lemma
4, it does not exist any other solution of the DLP, (πb,(πi),(πi
Ti)), such
that its components (πi) weakly Pareto dominates the ﬁrms’ proﬁt vector
of any other SPE∗-outcome. The reverse also holds: given both an LP and
DLP optimal solutions, with no weakly Pareto dominated component (πi),
they yield an SPE∗-outcome. In other words, the set of ﬁrms’ proﬁt vectors
associated to SPE∗-outcomes is the Pareto frontier of the polyhedron of
projection-sol(DLP)t oc o m p o n e n t s( πi).
Proposition 3 Let v be a value function. (  S,  p
  S) ∈ SPE∗-outcome set, if
and only if
i)   S ∈ sol(LP)
ii) (  πb,(  πi),(  πi
Ti)) ∈ Π where   πb = v(  S) −
 
k∈F(  S)   p
  S
k(  Sk),   πi =(   p
  S
i −
ci)(  Si) and   πi
Ti =(   p
  S
i − ci)(Ti) for all i ∈ N,Ti ⊆ Ωi.
Proof: See the Appendix.
By Corollary 3,   S ⊆ Ω is an equilibrium consumption set of GMB if
and only if   S ∈ argmaxS⊆Ω{(v − c)(S)}. W es h o wn e x tt h ee ﬃciency of
equilibrium net prices. To this end, let us check ﬁr s tt h a tt h eT-Core(G)
coincides with the solutions of the dual linear problem,
Proposition 4 Let v be a value function which deﬁnes the economy G(n+
1,v,c) and let T ∈ argmaxS⊆N{(v − c)(S)}.T h e n ,
i) if (πb,(πi),(πi
Ti)) ∈ sol(DLP),t h e n(πb,(πi)) ∈ T-Core(G),
ii) if (πb,(πi)) ∈ T-Core(G), then (πb,(πi),(πi
Ti)) ∈ sol(DLP) where
πi
Ti = πi for all i ∈ N,Ti ⊆ Ωi.
Proof: First let us prove i). Without loss of generality suppose that
T = N,t h e nT-Core(G)=Core(G). Let (πb,(πi),(πi
Ti)) ∈ sol(DLP)a n d












Ti ≥ (v − c)(T)
25where the ﬁrst inequality holds given that F(T) ⊆ K and the second and
third inequalities are veriﬁed by constraints (5) and (4) respectively. Thus,
πb +
 
i∈K πi ≥ V (K). Moreover, by the fundamental duality theorem
V (N)=πb +
 
i∈N πi. Hence, (πb,(πi)) ∈ Core(G).
To prove ii), let (qb,(qi)) ∈ Core(G)a n dS ∈ argmaxT⊆Ω{(v − c)(T)},
then trivially qi =0f o ra l li ∈ N\F(S). Deﬁne (qb,(qi),(qi
Ti)) where qi
Ti = qi






Ti = qb +
 
i∈F(T)
qi ≥ (v − c)(T)
and constraints (4) of DLP are satisﬁed. Moreover, by deﬁnition, qi ≥ qi
Ti
for all i ∈ N,Ti ⊆ Ωi, thus also constraints (5) are satisﬁed. Finally, by




qi = V (N)=( v − c)(S)
hence (qb,(qi),(qi
Ti)) ∈ sol(DLP). 
Then, by Propositions 3 and 4,
Corollary 4 Let (  S,  p
  S) be an SPE∗-outcome. Then, the buyer surplus,
v(  S) −
 
k∈F(  S)   p
  S
k(  Sk),a n dt h eﬁrms’ proﬁtv e c t o r( o rn e tp r i c ev e c t o r ) ,
(  p
  S − c)(  S),a r eas u b s e to fT−Core(G), for any T ⊆ N.
5 Monotonic social surplus functions
By Proposition 3, it is not diﬃcult to show that if all socially eﬃcient
consumption sets of the game GMB are such that   S ⊆ Ωi for some ﬁrm
i ∈ N, i.e., the buyer chooses only the products of a single ﬁrm, as in
example 1, then   S is sold as a bundle at price pi(  S)=v(  S) − α,w h e r e
α =m a x S⊆Ω\Ωi{(v−c)(S),0}.F i r mi obtains positive proﬁts, the products
of any other ﬁrm are oﬀered at marginal cost prices and the buyer obtains
ap o s i t i v ep a y o ﬀ equal to α. But, if there are two or more socially eﬃcient
pure consumption sets, then they are sold at marginal cost prices and the
buyer obtains the entire surplus. On the other hand, when the equilibrium
consumption set contains products of two o more ﬁrms, as in example 2, then
although ﬁrms might oﬀer their products as bundles for a special prices, the
26buyer selects a subset of products of each ﬁrm. Therefore, mixed bundling
m i g h ta l s ob ea no ﬀ-equilibrium pricing strategy, supporting equilibrium
outcomes.
However, the precise form of equilibrium prices is diﬃcult to obtain
unless we know the speciﬁc value functions. In this section we characterize
SPE∗-prices for monotonic social surplus functions. First, we need some
deﬁnitions.
Deﬁnition 3 (v − c) is monotonic if and only if (v − c)(S) ≤ (v − c)(T)
whenever S ⊆ T ⊆ Ω.
Then, monotonicity of (v − c) implies that the social surplus increases
for larger consumption sets.
The social marginal contribution of consumption set S, c∗(S), for all
S ⊆ Ω, i.e., the increase in social surplus due to S,i s
c∗(S)=( v − c)(Ω) − (v − c)(Ω\S)=v(Ω) − v(Ω\S) − c(S), ∀S ⊆ Ω
If (v − c) is monotonic, then, by Proposition 2, there exists an SPE∗-
outcome with Ω as the equilibrium consumption set. Furthermore, if (v−c)
is strictly monotonic then Ω is the only equilibrium consumption set. Next
Lemma shows that ﬁrm i’s equilibrium proﬁts have an upper bound.
Lemma 5 If (Ω,p) ∈ SPE∗-outcome set, then pi(Ωi) − c(Ωi) ≤ c∗(Ωi) for
all i ∈ N
Proof: Let i ∈ N,b yB C ,v(Ω)−
 











Thus, c∗(Ωi) ≥ pi(Ωi) − ci(Ωi). 
Recall that Si = Ωi ∩S, for all i ∈ N, then following Shapley (1962), we
say that ﬁrms are substitutes if the social marginal contribution of consump-
tion set S is bigger or equal to the sum of the social marginal contributions




c∗(Si) ∀S ⊆ Ω FS
27This property has been previously used in diﬀerent setting by several
authors as KC(1982) and BO(2002) among others. The former have em-
ployed it to justify that workers are better oﬀ by forming a union rather
than by bargaining individually with management, whereas the latter to
show that when buyers are substitutes, then the core has the lattice prop-
erty with respect to buyers. Next Proposition says that equilibrium prices
under monotonic social surplus functions satisfying FS are equal to marginal
costs plus ﬁrms’ social marginal contributions:
Proposition 5 Let (v − c) be a monotonic social surplus function and let
ﬁrms be substitutes (FS holds). Then (S∗,p ∗) ∈ SPE∗-outcome set, with
(v − c)(S∗)=( v − c)(Ω) and p∗
i(Ti)=c∗(Ωi)+c(Ti), for all Ti ⊆ Ωi,a n d
for all i ∈ N. The converse is also true.
If (v−c) is strictly monotonic, then the unique SPE∗-outcome is S∗ = Ω
Proof: See the Appendix.
Each ﬁrm i sells S∗










obtaining its marginal contribution as its proﬁts,
p∗
i(S∗
i ) − ci(S∗
i )=c∗(Ωi)
Moreover, the buyer surplus is positive, reﬂecting the market competition
under FS:



















i ) ≥ 0
Finally,
Deﬁnition 4 (1) (v − c) is convex if and only if
(v − c)(S + w) − (v − c)(S) ≤ (v − c)(T + w) − (v − c)(T)
whenever S ⊆ T ⊆ Ω\w,a n d
(2) (v − c) is concave if the opposite holds, i.e.,
(v − c)(S + w) − (v − c)(S) ≥ (v − c)(T + w) − (v − c)(T)
285.1 Concave value functions
Concavity of (v−c)r e ﬂects a kind of substitution among products or bundles
of products so that there is market competition and the buyer will obtain
some surplus. Two straightforward results are the following,
Lemma 6 Let (v−c) be a concave social surplus function and let c∗(w) ≥ 0
for all w ∈ Ω,t h e n(v − c) is monotonic.
Proof: Let w  = w , w,w  ∈ Ω.B yc o n c a v i t y ,
(v−c)(Ω\w)−(v−c)(Ω\{w,w }) ≥ (v−c)(Ω)−(v−c)(Ω\w )=c∗(w ) ≥ 0
thus (v−c)(Ω) ≥ (v−c)(Ω\w) ≥ (v−c)(Ω\{w,w }). In general, by induction,
(v − c)(Ω\{w1,...,w l}) ≥ (v − c)(Ω\{w1,...,w l,w l+1})
i.e., (v − c)(S) ≤ (v − c)(S + w).
Let S ⊆ T ⊆ Ω and let T\S = {w1,...,w l}.W eh a v et h a t
(v−c)(S) ≤ (v−c)(S∪{w1}) ≤ ... ≤ (v−c)(S∪{w1,...,w l−1}) ≤ (v−c)(T).

Lemma 7 Let (v − c) be a concave social surplus function, then ﬁrms are
substitutes, i.e. FS is satisﬁed.
Proof: Let S ⊆ Ω, F(S)={i1,...i l}. Then,













Proposition 5 and Lemmas 6 and 7 make it possible to oﬀer results for
concave social surplus functions.
Corollary 5 Let (v − c) be concave and c∗(w) ≥ 0, for all w ∈ Ω.T h e n ,
ﬁrms are substitutes, and ﬁrms’ equilibrium proﬁts (or net prices) are equal
to their social marginal contributions.
295.2 Convex social surplus functions
Convexity of (v − c)r e ﬂects complementarities among products or bundles
of products and hence among ﬁrms. Therefore it induces only weak market
competition so that ﬁrms can extract the entire buyer surplus. It is straight-
forward to prove that if (v − c) is nonnegative and convex, then (v − c)i s
monotonic.
Lemma 8 Let (v−c) be a convex social surplus function with (v−c)(w) ≥ 0
for all w ∈ Ω.T h e n(v − c) is monotonic.
The set of ﬁrms’ equilibrium proﬁts of convex social surplus functions
is the convex hull of n! vectors which are components (πi)i∈N of the corner
solutions of RDLP. Moreover, we show next that, if (v − c) is monotonic
and convex, then core(v − c) is non-empty: in fact, core(v − c)i st h es e t
of components (πi)i∈N of the solutions of RDLP, thus coinciding with the




Proposition 6 Let (v−c) be a convex value function, such that (v−c)(w) ≥
0 for all w ∈ Ω. Then, the following two sets are the same.
(i) core(v − c)
(ii) P(Π)={π ∈ Rn
+|(0,(πi),(πi
Ti)) ∈ Π where πi
Ti = πi for all i ∈
N,Ti ⊆ Ωi}
and the buyer’s surplus is zero.
Thus, if the social surplus function is convex, then the consumer’s surplus
is zero at any equilibrium outcome of the economy, so that ﬁrms extract the
entire surplus.
6 The role of mixed bundling
Let us consider the scenario where ﬁrms are not allowed to used mixed
bundling strategies. Thus, a strategy of ﬁrm j, j ∈ N, is a vector pj =
{pj(w)}w∈Ωj where pj(w)i sﬁrm j’s price of product w.L e tpi(Ti)b et h e
price of Ti ⊆ Ωi,t h e npi(Ti)=
 
w∈Ti pi(w), i.e., prices are linear and bundle
Ti is oﬀered for no special price. The buyer then select one consumption set
as a function of the vector of prices {pj(w)}j∈N,w∈Ωj that she already has
observed. This deﬁnes a two-stage game5 GLP.
5A restricted version of this model is LU (2002).
30Let us denoted a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of GLP as an
LSPE∗-outcome. The properties that LSPE∗-outcomes shall satisfy are
similar to BC1, FC1 and FC4. However, ﬁrms’ possible deviations under
linear prices are diﬀerent from those in mixed bundling settings. Thus,
condition FC2 is not of application here, given that the prices of two non-
disjoint bundles are not independent anymore: if a ﬁrm increases the price
of a product, it is simultaneously increasing the price of all the bundles
containing it. As in the mixed bundling framework, LSPE∗-outcomes are
associated to optimal solutions of some LP problems, denoted LPL.T h e
LPL problem is similar to LP but we need to change constraints (3),
 
S Ti
zS ≤ y(Ti,i) ∀i ∈ N,∀Ti ⊆ Ωi






y(Ti,i) ∀i ∈ N,∀w ⊆ Ωi
These new constraints tell us that w ⊆ Ωi is sold by ﬁrm i if and only if the
buyer has chosen a consumption set S with w ∈ S.L e tDLPL be the asso-
ciated dual problem and let (πb,(πi),(πw)) be a generic solution of DLPL.
Similar arguments to those of LP and DLP of section 3, ensures that LPL
always has an integer optimal solution and hence (by the fundamental du-
ality theorem) DLPL has an optimal solution with πb +
 
i∈N πi = VL (Ω).
















πi = VL (Ω)
πb,πi,πw ≥ 0
which will always have an optimal solution. It satisﬁes sol(RDLPL) ⊆




all i ∈ N,Ti ⊆ Ωi.
31Notice that if LP and DLP problems of the Package Assignment model
admit a degenerate solution in pure component prices, this solution is an
LSPE∗-outcome. Let ΠL denote the set of optimal solutions of DLPL
non Pareto-dominated on components (πi) and recall that Π is the corre-
sponding one for DLP problems. It is not diﬃcult to show that if both
frontiers have a non-empty intersection, i.e. if (πb,(πi),(πw)) ∈ ΠL∩ Π,
then ((πi),(πw)) will deﬁne an LSPE∗-price and proﬁts vectors (see AU,
2003b). However, when (πb,(πi),(πw)) ∈ ΠL\Π diﬀerent things may hap-
pen. Namely, although some solutions of the LPL and DLPL problems still
deﬁne LSPE∗-outcomes, others do not characterize them anymore. This
last case implying that either an LSPE∗-outcome does not exist or it is
ineﬃcient (see AU, 2003b, for the proofs of these results). To clarify the
above discussion let us consider the following example in LU(2002), where
existence of linear pricing equilibria is not always guaranteed.
Example:L e tv be as in example 1. The following tables shows the
LSPE∗-outcomes for linear (additive) prices.
Table 3: Equilibrium outcomes in linear prices
Equilibrium in Linear prices
Region I Region II Region III Region IV
0 < δ ≤ 6 6 < δ < 12 12 ≤ δ < 13 13 ≤ δ < 16
  S = {a,d}   S = {a,b}   S = {a,b}
pa




1 =1 6− δ
pb
1 =1 4− 2
3δ equilibrium pb
1 =1 pa












cs =0 cs =1 3 cs = δ
no eﬃcient eﬃcient eﬃcient
In this example LSPE∗-outcomes can be ineﬃcient (Region I) or could
not exist (Region II). Notice ﬁr s tt h a tf o r1 3≤ δ < 16, (region IV), {a,b} ∈
sol(LPL)a n dπb = δ,πa =m i n {16 − δ,2},πb =1 6− δ − πa,πc = πd =
0 is a solution of RDLPL which also deﬁnes a solution of RDLP,i . e . ,
(πb,(πi),(πw)) ∈ ΠL∩ Π. Hence the outcome (S,p), where S = {a,b} and
p(w)=πw is an LSPE∗-outcome. Now, for δ < 13 the unique solution of
RDLPL is πb =1 3 ,πa =2 ,πb =1 ,πc = πd =0a n di td o e sn o tb e l o n gt o
Π anymore, i.e. ΠL∩ Π = ∅. However, for 12 ≤ δ < 13 this solution still
32deﬁnes an LSPE∗-outcome. But, for δ < 12, LPL and RDLPL solutions
do not characterize LSPE∗-outcomes, this meaning that LSPE∗-outcomes
could not exist or could be ineﬃcient. For instance, let δ = 10 and consider
the optimal solution to LPL and RDLPL problems: outcome (S,p)w h e r e
S = {a,b}
pa =2 ,p b =1
pc = pd =0 .
ﬁrm 1 obtains a proﬁt of 3 and the buyer’s surplus is 3. Firm 1 has incentives
to change its prices so that pa = pb =5− ε,f o rε small enough. Then, the
buyer chooses bundle {a,d}, maximizing her surplus and ﬁrm 1 obtains a
proﬁte q u a lt o5− ε bigger than 3.
Thus, there are important diﬀerences between games GMB and GLP:
ﬁrst, a subgame perfect equilibrium may not exists in linear prices (Region
II); secondly, the equilibrium outcomes may be non-eﬃcient (Region I). In
the above example, when 0 < δ ≤ 6 (Region I) the game GLP h a sa l w a y sa
unique equilibrium: the buyer purchases the consumption set {a,d},w h i c h
is not socially eﬃcient and the equilibrium prices are such that the ﬁrms
extract the entire surplus, leaving the buyer with zero surplus, v(a,d)=
15 = pa
1 + pd
2. However, if mixed bundling is allowed, then the unique
equilibrium consumption set is {a,b},t h es o c i a l l ye ﬃcient. Firm 1 must sell
its pure system as a bundle for the price pab
1 =1 6− δ, lower than the sum
of the prices of its two products separately and ﬁrm 2 sets prices equal to
zero. Thus, the buyer’s surplus is δ.O b s e r v et h a ti f3 < δ ≤ 6t h e nb o t h
ﬁrms are worse oﬀ in GMB relatively to GLP, but if 0 < δ ≤ 3t h e nﬁrm 1
is better oﬀ in GMB and ﬁrm 2 is better oﬀ in GLP. Now, let assume that
6 < δ < 12 (Region II), then no subgame perfect equilibria exists in GLP,
thus mixed bundling is needed to guarantee equilibrium’s existence. This
results are in contradiction with AL(1993). They found that ﬁrms will in
equilibrium choose to precommit to linear prices better than allowing mixed
bundling. This will be only the case in Region I when 3 < δ ≤ 6. But, if
ﬁrms have precommitted to linear prices in Region II, then the market would
not achieve any equilibrium outcome meanwhile mixed bundling guarantees
the socially eﬃcient consumption set {a,b},a tp r i c epab
1 =1 6− δ,a n dw i t h
a buyer’s surplus of δ.
337 The Model with m buyers
L e tu se x t e n dt h ea b o v em o d e lt oo n ew i t hm buyers, denoted by b ∈ B =
{1,...,m}. Each buyer has a value function deﬁned over sets of bundles
of objects, vb(S), S ⊆ 2Ω.A n allocation of objects to buyers is a vector
(S1,...,Sm)w h e r eSb ⊆ Ω,S b ∩ Sb 
= ∅ for any b,b  ∈ B, b  = b .I t i s
possible that for some b, Sb = ∅. Assume, for simplicity, that the unit costs
of production are zero.
As in the previous model, each ﬁrm i ∈ N chooses prices pi(Ti)f o r
any set Ti ⊆ Ωi and then, each buyer b ∈ B, after observing price vector
p =( p1,...,p n) ∈ P1 ×···×P n, selects the consumption set Sb ⊆ Ω which









Let (S1,...,Sm) be an allocation and denote by Sb
i = Sb ∩ Ωi the set of
products sold by ﬁrm i to buyer b, hence S = ∪b∈BSb.T h u s ,ﬁrm i sells the
set of products Si = ∪b∈BSb
i, which can be arranged as a vector (S1
i ,...,Sm
i ).
Let Ψi be the set of such vectors associated to any possible allocation and
ψi ∈ Ψi any of its elements.
Given b ∈ B,S ⊆ Ω,d e ﬁne z(S,b)e q u a lt o1i fb u y e rb chooses consump-
tion set S, zero otherwise; for any i ∈ N and ψi ∈ Ψi deﬁne y(ψi,i)e q u a l
to 1 if ﬁrm i sells its products to buyers according to ψi and zero otherwise.










z(S,b) ≤ 1 ∀b ∈ B (7)
 
ψi∈Ψi











y(ψi,i), ∀i ∈ N,T ⊆ Ωi(9)
z(S,b),y(ψi,i) ∈ {0,1}
where constraints (7) ensure that only one consumption set is chosen by
each buyer, constraints (8) guarantee that each ﬁrm i sells every individual
product to at most one buyer, and constraints (9) set that the bundle chosen
34by buyer b from ﬁrm i is the one sold by ﬁrm i to buyer b.L e tLP’ be the
linear relaxation of ILP’,s ot h a tc o n s t r a i n t sz(S,b),y(ψi,i) ∈ {0,1} change
to z(S,b),y(ψi,i) ≥ 0. Let VILP(N,B)a n dVLP(N,B)d e n o t et h eo p t i m a l
value of ILP’ and LP’ respectively, thus VLP(N,B) ≥ VILP(N,B). The



















≥ 0 ∀i ∈ N,∀ψi =( S1
i ,...,Sm
i ) ∈ Ψi
πb,πi,πi
T ≥ 0
where πi can be interpreted as ﬁrm i’s net proﬁt, i ∈ N; πb is buyer b’s
surplus; and πi
T is the price that ﬁrm i sets to bundle T, i ∈ N,T ⊆ Ωi.T h e
feasible region of LP’ is nonempty, which implies that DLP’ also has an
optimal solution, say VDLP(N,B). Among the optimal solutions of DLP’
let us consider those whose coordinates (πi), for all i ∈ N, are not Pareto-
dominated by any other optimal solution. A way to obtain some of these
















≥ 0 ∀i ∈ N,∀ψi =( S1
i ,...,Sm









By the duality theorem of linear programming we have that
VDRLP(N,B)=VDLP(N,B)=VLP(N,B) ≥ VILP(N,B).
As an extension of Proposition 2 it can be proven that if VLP(N,B)=
VILP(N,B), then an optimal solution of LP’ together with a non Pareto-
dominated solution of DLP’ in coordinates (πi), for all i ∈ N, yield an
35SPE∗-outcome of the m- buyers’ model. The equilibrium price vectors are
mixed bundling prices. Thus, the existence of SPE∗-outcomes depends on
the existence of an integer optimal solution of LP’.
Trivially, if all buyers have additive value functions (vb(S)+vb(T)=
vb(S ∪ T) for all b ∈ B and S,T ⊆ Ω) then, equilibrium prices will also
be linear, with pi(w)=m a x b{vb(w)}, for all ﬁrm i ∈ N,w ∈ Ωi and ex-
istence of (degenerate) SPE∗-outcomes is always guaranteed. The next
sub-sections analyze conditions on buyers’ value functions which ensure ex-
istence of SPE∗-outcomes.
7.1 Homogeneous buyers
Let us ﬁrst analyze the case in which all value functions are the same. We




S⊆Ω vb(S)z(S,b) is maximized at an
integer feasible allocation. Let (λS)S⊆Ω, be a balanced vector if λS ≥ 0f o r
all S ⊆ Ω and for all w ∈ Ω,
 
S w λS = 1. A value function v(.)d e ﬁned
on subsets S ⊆ Ω is balanced if for any balanced vector (λS)S⊆Ω we have  
S λSv(S) ≤ v(Ω).
Result 1: If all agents have the same value function v(.), and if v(.)i s
balanced, then VLP(N,B)=VILP(N,B) and there exists an SPE∗-outcome
(as solution of the primal and dual linear problems).






thus LP’ has an optimal integer solution determined by, say, allocation
(Ω,∅,...,∅). More precisely, (  z(S,b),   y(ψi,i)) is an optimal solution of LP’,
where   z(Ω,1) = 1 and   z(S,b)=0i fS  = Ω or b  =1a n d  y(ψi,i)=1i f
ψi =( Ωi,∅,...,∅)f o ra l li ∈ N, and zero otherwise.
Proof: Let ((z(S,b),(y(ψi,i)) be a feasible solution of LP’,t h u sf o r




b∈B z(S,b) ≤ 1. Deﬁne λw =
 
b∈B z(w,b)+( 1−  
S w
 
b∈B z(S,b)). For S ⊆ Ω, such that |S| ≥ 2d e ﬁne λS =
 
b∈B z(S,b).

















where the ﬁrst inequality is given by λS ≥
 
b∈B z(S,b) and the second one
from balancedness. 
36Moreover, given that a convex value function is balanced we conclude
that if all agents have the same convex value function, then the set of SPE∗-
outcomes is non empty.
7.2 Heterogeneous buyers
The existence of SPE∗-outcomes can be easily extended to two types of
buyers, provided they have strictly convex value functions i.e., there are two
types of buyers such that agents type j =1 ,2h a v et h es a m ec o n v e xv a l u e
function.
To see this, let B1 be the set of type 1 buyers and B2 be the set of type
2. It is not diﬃcult to show that at any optimal solution of DRLP’ the
buyers’ surplus is the same for all of them and equal to zero (the proof runs
similar to the single buyer model).
Case 1: In the optimal solution of ILP’, there exists b ∈ B1 such that
VILP(N,B)=vb(Ω). Relabeling the buyers if necessary, b = 1. Consider the




pi(Ωi) ≤ v1(Ω) − v1(Ω\Ωi) for all i ∈ N
pi(T)=pi(Ωi)f o ra l li ∈ N,T ⊆ Ωi
where conditions 1 and 2 are simultaneously veriﬁed by convexity of v1.I t
can be checked that this allocation and price vector deﬁne an equilibrium
outcome.
Case 2: In the optimal solution of ILP’, there exists b ∈ B1 and b  ∈ B2
such that VILP(N,B)=vb(S)+vb (T)f o rs o m eS,T ⊆ Ω,w i t hS ∩ T =
∅. Relabeling the buyers if necessary, b =1 ,b   = 2. Also notice that by
convexity of the value functions, cases 1 and 2 are the unique integer optimal
solutions .
Consider the following allocation,   ψ =( S,T,∅,...,∅)a n dt h ep r i c ev e c t o r







pi(K)=pi(Si)+pi(Ti)f o ra l li ∈ N,K ⊆ Ωi
37and pi(Ti),p i(Si) bigger than some amount characterized by the constraints
of DLP’. It can be checked that this allocation and price vector deﬁnes an
equilibrium outcome.
The extension of this result to more than two types of buyers remains
an open question. For instance, in the three types case the existence of
Walrasian equilibria with linear prices is not guaranteed as shown in the
following example with one ﬁrm, and three types of buyers (see, BM, 1996):
Example in BM (1996)
S 1231 ,21 ,32 ,31 ,2,3
v1 1 1 1 30 3 3 40
v2111 3 3 0 3 4 0
v3 1 1 1 3 3 30 40
However, solving the linear programming problem and it restricted dual
we ﬁnd the following SPE∗-outcome,
ψ =( {1,2,3},∅,∅)
p(S)=4 0 f o r a l l S ⊆ Ω
Thus, mixed bundling prices guarantee the existence of eﬃcient equi-
librium outcomes. Our intuition suggests that under strict convexity of the
buyers’ value functions there always exist SPE∗-outcomes in mixed bundling
prices, independently of the number of types of the buyers. Nevertheless,
something more precise can be said if we consider a single ﬁrm model.
Result 2: Let N = 1, a single seller, and m buyers with strictly convex
value functions. Then the set of SPE∗- o u t c o m e si sn o ne m p t y .
Proof:L e t(   z,  y)b ea no p t i m a ls o l u t i o no fILP’ which deﬁnes the allo-
cation (  S1,...,  Sm). By convexity, vb (  Sb) ≤ vb(  Sb), for every   Sb  = ∅ and for
all b,b  ∈ B,b  = b . Suppose that there exists b,b  ∈ B,a n dvb (  Sb) >v b(  Sb)
then,
vb(  Sb)+vb (  Sb 
) <v b (  Sb)+vb (  Sb 
) ≤ vb (  Sb ∪   Sb 
)
which contradict the optimality of (  S1,...,  Sm).
Now deﬁne   πb =0f o ra l lb ∈ B,   π1 =
 
b∈B vb(  Sb
1)a n d  π1
T =m a x b vb(T).
It can be checked that ((  πb),  π1,(  π1
T)) is a feasible solution of DLP’,t h u s
VDLP(1,b) ≤
 
b∈B vb(  Sb
1)
38Then,







b∈B vb(  Sb
1) ≤ VILP(1,B) and we conclude that VILP(1,B)=VLP(1,b),
(  S1,...,   Sm) is an optimal allocation of both ILP’ and LP’,a n dj o i n t l yw i t h
the vector of prices given by (  π1
T)d e ﬁnes an equilibrium outcome. 
Finally, consider the case in which all buyers are characterized by a
value function vb,b ∈ B verifying KC(1982)’s gross substitution condition
(gs). Given a buyer b ∈ B, with value function vb and a price vector p,l e t
Db(p)b e
Db(p)={S ⊆ Ω|vb(S) −
 
Si∈S
pi(Si) ≥ vb(T) −
 
Ti∈T
pi(Ti) for all T ⊆ Ω}
Now, deﬁne (gs) as follows,
Given b ∈ B, vb satisﬁes gross substitution if for any two price vectors
p and q such that pi(T) ≤ qi(T) for all i ∈ N,T ⊆ Ωi and any S ∈ Db(p),
there exists T ∈ Db(q) such that Ti = Si if pi(Si)=qi(Si).
The results in GS(1999) and BVSV(2002) can be extended to cover
SPE∗-outcomes under mixed bundling pricing. Let rb(S,p)=m i n T∈Db(p) |S∩
T| be the dual rank function of a matroid. Then by the matroid partition
theorem if for all T ⊆ Ω,
 
b∈B rb(T,p) ≤ |T|, then there exists a partition
of Ω so that every buyer receives at most one element of Db(p). In other
case, choose T  ⊆ Ω, such that
 
b∈B rb(T,p) > |T| and is the one verifying
that property with minimal cardinality. Now, following a modiﬁcation of
the algorithm proposed by GS(2000), each ﬁrm i increases the price of its
bundles Si ⊆ Ωi such that Si ∩ Ti  = ∅ by   > 0. After a ﬁnite number of
rounds we obtain a price vector and an allocation which deﬁnes an optimal
solution of both LP’ and ILP’.
We conclude by noting that existence of SPE∗-outcomes for the m-
buyers’ model under general value functions is hardly guaranteed. However,
our intuition suggests that if we allow mixed bundling prices to be also non-
anonymous (i.e. buyer’s dependent), some partial results could be given
(see BO, 2002, for the Walrasian Equilibrium set up). This is left for future
research.
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P r o o fo fL e m m a3 : If i/ ∈ F(  S), then constraint
 
Ti⊆Ωi y(T,i) ≤ 1i s
satisﬁed with strict inequality and by the complementary slackness condition
πi =0 .N o w ,b yc o n s t r a i n t s( 5 )i nDLP,0=πi ≥ πi
Ti ≥ 0 and ii) is satisﬁed.
Now we prove i): if i ∈ F(  S), again by constraints (5), πi ≥ πi
Ti for all
Ti ⊆ Ωi. Given that z  S = 1, then by the complementary slackness condition,
πb +
 
  Si∈  S πi
  Si
= v(  S). Thus,
πb = v(  S) −
 
i∈N
πi = v(  S) −
 











i∈F(  S) πi. But this, in turn,
implies that for all i ∈ F(  S), πi = πi
  Si
given that by (5) πi ≥ πi
  Si
. 
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 :W.l.o.g., we assume, for simplicity, that
marginal costs are zero. We prove ﬁrst that (  S,  p) ∈ SPE∗-outcome set
under partition µ = {N} (µ-DLP=RDLP)a n d  pi(Ti)=  πi
Ti. To this end,
we check that conditions BC, FC1 and FC4 are satisﬁed.
Step 1: Condition BC
Given S ⊆ Ω, by Lemma 3 and constraints (4) in DLP (or RDLP),




Si = v(  S) −
 
  Si∈  S
  πi





= v(  S) −
 
i∈F(  S)




thus v(  S) −
 
i∈F(  S)   pi(  S) ≥ v(S) −
 
i∈F(S)   pi(S).
Step 2: Condition FC1
If v(  S) −
 
i∈F(  S)   pi(  Si) = 0, then it is trivially veriﬁed for Sj = ∅.
Now suppose that   πb = v(  S) −
 
i∈F(  S)   pi(  Si) > 0 and that there exists
j ∈ F(  S) such that for all S  ⊆ Ω\Ωj,
  πb = v(  S) −
 
i∈F(  S)
  pi(  Si) >v (S ) −
 
i∈F(S )
  pi(S 
i)
Let   = 1
2 minS⊆Ω\Ωj{v(  S)−
 
i∈F(  S)   pi(  Si)−(v(S)−
 
i∈F(S)   pi(Si))} > 0.
40Deﬁne,
  πb =   πb −  
  πi =
 
  πi +   if i = j





Ti +   if i = j,Ti =   Si
  πi
Ti otherwise
Let us show that (  πb,(  πi),(  πi
Ti)) satisﬁes all RDLP constraints. Given
S ⊆ Ω,i fSj =   Sj then








Si +   π
j















≥   πb −
1
2
(v(  S) −
 
i∈N
  pi(  S) − v(S)+
 
i∈N





=   πb −
1
2













=   πb −
1
2




















Thus, constraints (4) are satisﬁed. To prove that so do constraints (5),
consider diﬀerent cases. For all i  = j,   πi −   πi
Ti =   πi −   πi
Ti ≥ 0. If i = j but
Ti  =   Si then   πi −   πi
Ti =   πi +   −   πi
Ti ≥   πi −   πi
Ti ≥ 0; if i = j and Ti =   Si
then   πi −   πi
Ti =   πi +   − (  πi
Ti +  )=  πi −   πi
Ti ≥ 0.
Finally,   πb +
 
i∈N   πi =   πb −   +
 
i∈N\j   πi +   πj +   =   πb +
 
i∈N   πi =
V (Ω). Then (  πb,(  πi),(  πi
Ti)) veriﬁes all RDLP constraints and
 
i∈N   πi =
 
i∈N   πi +  >
 
i∈N   πi which contradicts the optimality of (  πb,(  πi),(  πi
Ti)).
Step 3: Condition FC4
Let A ⊆ N\F(  S), B ⊆ F(  S). First, recall, by Lemma 3, that   πi =   πi
Ti =
0 for all i ∈ A,Ti ⊆ Ωi. Second, by the dual constraints (5) and Lemma 3
that   πi =   πi
  Si
≥   πi
Ti for all i ∈ B,Ti ⊆ Ωi.
41Then, given S ⊆ Ω,w h e r e( A ∪ B) ⊆ F(S),
v(  S) −
 
i∈F(  S)
  pi(  Si)=v(  S) −
 
  Si∈  S
  πi



















  pi(Si) −
 
i∈B
  pi(  Si)
and FC4 is veriﬁed.
Thus, (  S,  p)v e r i ﬁes conditions BC, FC1 and FC4, and hence (  S,  p) ∈
SPE∗-outcome set when µ = {N}.
The proof for any other partition µ  = {N} is not remarkably diﬀerent
from case µ = {N}. Finally the proposition holds if we consider any price
vector such that   πi
Ti ≤   pi(Ti) ≤   πi for all i ∈ N,Ti ⊆ Ωi given that if
(  πb,(  πi),(  πi
Ti)) ∈ sol(µ−DLP), then (  πb,(  πi),(πi
Ti)) ∈ sol(µ−DLP), where
  πi
Ti ≤ πi
Ti ≤   πi for all i ∈ N,Ti ⊆ Ωi. 
To prove Corollary 1 we need the following lemma which establishes that
given (S,p) ∈ SPE∗-outcome set then, the net price vector (pS − c(S)) is a
solution of DLP, where vector pS is deﬁned from p as in page 11.
Lemma 9 If (  S,  p) ∈ SPE∗-outcome set, then
i)   S ∈ sol(LP) and
ii) (  πb,(  πi),(  πi
Ti)) ∈ sol(DLP) where   πb = v(  S) −
 
k∈F(  S)   pk(  Sk) and







  pi(  Si) − ci(  Si) if i ∈ F(  S),   pi(Ti) − ci(Ti) ≥   pi(  Si) − ci(  Si)
  pi(Ti) − ci(Ti) if i ∈ F(  S),   pi(Ti) − ci(Ti) <   pi(  Si) − ci(  Si)
0 if i/ ∈ F(  S)
for all i ∈ N,Ti ⊆ Ωi.
P r o o fo fl e m m a9 :   S ∈ sol(LP) by Corollary 3. Now, let us prove
that (  πb,(  πi),(  πi
Ti)) ∈ sol(DLP):
Step 1: Constraints (4).
Given S ⊆ Ω,l e tA = F(S)\F(  S)a n dB = {i ∈ F(  S)|(  pi − ci)(  Si) ≤
(  pi − ci)(Si)} ∩ F(S). Thus,   πk
Sk =0forall k∈ A and π k
Sk =   πk
  Sk
for all
42k ∈ B. By FC3 it is veriﬁed that,
  πb = v(  S) −
 
k∈F(  S)





≥ (v − c)(S) −
 
k∈F(S)\(A∪B)
(  pk − ck)(Sk) −
 
k∈B
(  pk − ck)(  Sk)



























Hence,   πb +
 
Sk∈S   πk
Sk ≥ (v − c)(S).
Step 2: Constraints (5).
By deﬁnition   πi −   πi
Ti ≥ 0.
We have seen that (  πb,(  πi),(  πi
Ti)) is a feasible solution. In the next step






  πk =( v−c)(  S)−
 
k∈F(  S)
(  pk−ck)(  Sk)+
 
k∈F(  S)
(  pk−ck(  Sk)=( v−c)(  S)=V (Ω)
thus, (  πb,(  πi),(  πi
Ti)) ∈ sol(DLP). 
P r o o fo fc o r o l l a r y1 :By Proposition 2 when µ = {N},t h e n(   S,  p) ∈
SPE∗-outcome set. Now, let us consider any other (S,p)i ns e tSPE∗.B y
lemma 9, (πb,(πi),(πi
Ti)) ∈ sol(DLP)w h e r e( πb,(πi),(πi
Ti)) is deﬁned as
above. Moreover, by Corollary 3, (v − c)(  S)=( v − c)(S).
Thus, given that (  πb,(  πi),(  πi
T)) ∈ sol(RDLP)i tm u s tb ev e r i ﬁed that  
k∈N   πk ≥
 
k∈N πk. Hence,
v(  S) −
 
k∈F(  S)












43and the consumer surplus associated to (  S,  p) is the lowest among all the
SPE-outcomes. 
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 : Let (  S,  p
  S)b ei ns e tSPE∗. By Corollary 3,
  S ∈ sol(LP)a n db yL e m m a9 ,(   πb,(  πi),(  πi
Ti)) ∈ sol(DLP).
Moreover, by Lemma 4, (  p − c) is not Pareto dominated by any other
SPE∗-net price vector and nor is (  πi).
Now, suppose that   S ∈ sol(LP), (  πb,(  πi),(  πi
Ti)) ∈ Π.L e t  p
  S be such
that   p
  S
i (Si)=  πi
Si + ci(Si) for all i ∈ N,Si ⊆ Ωi
Step 1: Condition BC.
Given S ⊆ Ω,b yc o n s t r a i n t( 4 )  πb +
 
Si∈S   πi
Si ≥ (v − c)(S), but   πb =
(v − c)(  S) −
 
  Si∈  S   πi
  Si
thus,
(v − c)(  S) −
 
  Si∈  S
  πi





and hence v(  S) −
 
k∈F(  S)   p
  S
k(  Sk) ≥ v(S) −
 
k∈F(S)   p
  S
k(Sk).
Step 2: Condition FC1.
If   πb =0t h e nF C 1h o l d sf o rSj = ∅.I f  πb > 0 then suppose there exits
j ∈ F(  S) such that for all S ⊆ Ω\Ωj it is veriﬁed that











We can deﬁne (πb,(πi),(πi
Ti)) as in step 2 of the proof of the Propo-
sition 2 which veriﬁes all the constraint in DLP and Pareto dominates
(  πb,(  πi),(  πi
Ti)), contradiction.
Step 3: Condition FC4, reproduce the same reasoning that step 3 of the
p r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 .
Hence (  S,  p
  S) ∈ SPE∗-outcome set. 
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5 :W.l.o.g., we prove the proposition assuming
for simplicity that marginal costs are zero. Given that v is monotonic v(Ω) ≥
v(S). Moreover,
p∗
i(Ti) ≥ v(Ω\(Ωi\T)) − v(Ω\Ωi)
Thus, prices are all positive and p∗
i(Ωi)=v(Ω) − v(Ω\Ωi).
F i r s tw ep r o v et h a t( Ω,p ∗) ∈ SPE∗-outcome set, by showing that Ω ∈
sol(LP)a n d( πb,(πi),(πi
Ti)) ∈ sol(RDLP)w h e r eπi
Ti = p∗
i(Ti), πi = p∗
i(Ωi)










thus πb ≥ 0.
Step 2: Constraints (4) in RDLP are veriﬁed.
Given S ⊆ Ω,b y( F S ) ,c∗(Ω\S)=v(Ω) − v(S) ≥
 
i∈N c∗(Ωi\S), but




























Step 3: Constraints (5) in RDLP are veriﬁed.
Given S ⊆ Ωi and i ∈ N,
πi
Si = p∗
i(Si) ≤ v(Ω) − v(Ω\Ωi)=p∗
i(Ωi)=πi
Step 4: Constraint (6) in RDLP is veriﬁed.
Notice that πi
Ωi = p∗















T h u s ,w eh a v ep r o v e dt h a t( πb,(πi),(πi
Ti)) ∈ sol(DLP). To show that
(πb,(πi),(πi
Ti)) ∈ sol(RDLP) we need the following last step.
Step 5: (πb,(πi),(πi
Ti)) ∈ sol(RDLP)
Consider any (  πb,(  πi),(  πi
Ti)) ∈ sol(RDLP). Then, by monotonicity of
v and Proposition 2, (Ω,   p) ∈ SPE∗-outcome set, where   pi(Si)=  πi
Si and




  πi =
 
i∈N










45Now, consider S∗ such that v(S∗)=v(Ω). Then by (FS),










i ) for all i ∈ N.M o r e o v e r ,f o ra l li ∈ N\F(S∗)a n da l l
Ti ⊆ Ωi , p∗
i(Ti) = 0, given that
0 ≤ v(Ω\(Ωi\Ti)) − v(Ω\Ωi) ≤ p∗
i(Ti)
≤ v(Ω) − v(Ω\Ωi) ≤ v(Ω) − v(S∗)=0
Then (πb,(πi),(πi
Ti)) ∈ sol(DLP), where πi
Ti = p∗
i(Ti), πi = p∗
i(S∗





i ). That (πb,(πi),(πi
Ti)) ∈ sol(RDLP)i sp r o v e d
in the same way as above.
Running the argument of step 2 in reverse yields the equivalence.

Proof of Proposition 6:
Step 1: conv{xσ(v − c)|σ ∈ Σ} = core(v − c).
Let Σ be the set of permutations (orderings) of N = {1,2,...,n} and let
σ ∈ Σ be any of its elements. Let Pσ
i be the set of ﬁrms which precede ﬁrm
i with respect to permutation σ, i.e., for all i ∈ N and σ ∈ Σ,
Pσ
i = {j ∈ N|σ(j) < σ(i)}
Deﬁne, following Shapley (1971), the marginal contribution vector xσ(v−
c) ∈ Rn of (v − c) with respect to ordering σ by,
xσ
i (v − c)=V (Pσ
i + i) − V (Pσ
i ), for all i ∈ N
If (v − c) is convex, then the marginal contribution vector xσ(v − c)i s
positive.
The equality between the sets conv{xσ(v − c)|σ ∈ Σ} and core(v − c)i s
given in Driesen 1993.
Step 2: core(v − c)=P(Π)
Proof of core(v−c) ⊆ P(Π). Let x ∈ core(v−c). Deﬁne πb =0 ,πi = xi
and πi
Ti = xi for all i ∈ N,Ti ⊆ Ωi It is straightforward that (πb,(πi),(πi
Ti))






xi = V (N)=( v − c)(Ω)
46so that (πb,(πi),(πi
Ti)) ∈ sol(RDLP) and component (πi) cannot be Pareto-
dominated by any other solution, hence (πb,(πi),(πi
Ti)) ∈ Π and (πi) ∈
P(Π).
Proof of P(Π) ⊆ core(v − c). Suppose on the contrary that P(Π) -
core(v − c). Then there exists z ∈ P(Π) such that z/ ∈ core(v − c˙ ). By
proposition 3, vector z is not Pareto-dominated by any other vector in P(Π).
However, the equality between the sets core(v − c)a n dconv{xσ(v − c)|σ ∈
Σ},j o i n t l yw i t hz/ ∈ core(v − c) yields the existence of io such that zi0 >
V (N) − V (N\i0)=( v − c)(Ω) − (v − c)(Ω\Ωi0).
On the other hand, by monotonicity of (v − c) and Proposition 3, we
have that (Ω,p) ∈ SPE∗-outcome set, where pi(Ti)=zi + c(Ti) for all
i ∈ N,Ti ⊆ Ωi;a n db yL e m m a5 ,pi(Ωi) ≤ v(Ω) − v(Ω\Ωi) for all i ∈ N.
Now we obtain
pi0(Ωi0)=zi0 + c(Ωi0) > (v − c)(Ω) − (v − c)(Ω\Ωi0)+c(Ωi0)
= v(Ω) − v(Ω\Ωi0) − c(Ω)+c(Ω\Ωi0)+c(Ωi0)
= v(Ω) − v(Ω\Ωi0)
We conclude that pi0(Ωi0) >v (Ω)−v(Ω\Ωi0) which contradicts Lemma
5. 
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